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1STABILISATION WITHOUT ADJUSTMENT: NAMIBIA IN TRANSITION
Stabilisation After Decline
Over 1986-1988 the economy of Namibia stabilised in classic IMF 
terms. The external balance improved; external debt fell as did 
reliance on external consumption transfers; the government borrowing 
requirement vanished; GDP ceased to fall and indeed rose albeit less 
rapidly than population. The exchange rate declined faster than 
inflation so that export sector profits reappeared and became 
healthy. A classic case of the virtues of orthodox IMF adjustment 
carried out without the IMF it could be argued especially as in the 
early 1980s fiscal irresponsibility characterised by rapid real wage 
and employment increases in the government service, an increasingly 
overvalued currency and losses for several key sub-sectors of exports 
and a falling GDP had characterised the territorial economy.
Continuing this line of analytical sketching it could also be argued 
that the World Bank's goal of stabilisation with structural 
adjustment and growth of GDP per capita was not being met. Nor was 
its condition that stabilisation which rent the fabric of society was 
unsustainable. GDP growth remained less than that of population. 
Wage growth was at best parallel to prices while wage employment as 
static or declining absolutely and declining relative to population. 
Unemployment and the share of households in absolute poverty rose; 
real state expenditure on health and education fell. No real change 
in production structures was achieved, the recovery owed more to 
exogenous price and weather changes than to any other factor. Nor 
was future structural change nor growth being built in to the 
economy; net fixed investment in the directly productive sectors 
remained negative with private capital in flight from fixed assets 
within Namibia and from Namibia to elsewhere (along with some of the 
smaller capitalists). Again a classical case of stabilisation for an 
orderly, sustained economic decline.
Both analytical points do tell something about the Namibian economy 
over 1986-88. It is a mineral and livestock/animal products export
2economy which was hit by terms of trade worsening, drought, fiscal 
gaps and late adjustment to the changed economic context of the 
1980s. In that sense it resembles Zambia as does its record of 
failing to achieve growth when it did (briefly albeit repetitively in 
Zambia's case) follow classic IMF stabilisation. It does not much 
resemble its neighbour and mirror (despite a parallel 
mineral/livestock base) economy Botswana which averaged nearly 10% 
annual real GDP growth, rising employment, a healthy government 
budget (treating concessional external finance as acceptable) and a 
huge basic external balance surplus as well as lesser inflation, a 
declining share of households in absolute poverty and rising real 
state expenditure on health and education as well as water and food 
security.
A Poor Example and/or A Special Case
Up to a point the sketch and the comparisons are useful. Namibia's 
economy was stunned by external shocks and mismanaged. Partial 
reversal of the shocks and of the mismanagement has halted decline 
but not restored either development or sustained growth of output per 
person. Arguably the 1986-88 macroeconomic record is better than 
that of Zambia but clearly very much worse than that of Botswana. 
That is a poor example for the Republic of South Africa's claim that 
one virtue of white rule in Southern Africa is better economic
management and greater investor confidence in the state and the
future. Judging by the record Botswana rule would be much better on 
both counts. That point is a valid one but somewhat limited in 
identifying two key characteristics about the economy of occupied 
Namibia and sketching the depth of its economic malaise whether 
defined in human condition or growth and structural change terms.
Namibia remains what it has been since 1966 - a territory illegally
occupied by the Republic of South Africa. And it remains a territory
wrenched by continuing war and rising militarisation. These two 
factors are central to explaining the nature of its 1980-85 economic 
decline and the limits of 1986-88 stabilisation.
3The fiscal irresponsibility stemmed from two basic causes:
a. 'security' expenditure to assist RSA in holding Namibia in the 
face of rising armed resistance;
b. "buy a bantustan" style spending sprees on parallel 
adminstrations and a black public sector employee middle class 
to defuse rising civil and political organisation and 
opposition to continued RSA occupation.
The budgetary impact was disastrous and the results at best marginal 
and temporary. Certainly the war has not been lost but as total RSA 
expenditure on it is of the same order as or greater than the 
territorial product of GDP and, despite this, RSA troops in 1988 were 
forced out of Angola by a military defeat thinly papered over by a 
negotiating facade, it is hardly productive expenditure even in a 
long term RSA perspective. Possibly a black middle class with 
consumption demands likely to plague an independent Namibian state 
has been created but the 1987-88 growth of militant trade unionism 
and the rising tide of church centred (or at least channelled) and 
political opposition to the so-called 'multi party government' 
suggest that multiple administrations and real wage increases (now 
being eroded under austerity) for a black state employee elite have 
brought little or nothing except a high tax burden and a rigid 
expenditure pattern.
Similarly much of the production - profitability - investment impasse 
can be related directly to occupation and war. An independent 
Namibia (like Botswana) could have negotiated an EEC beef quota, thus 
escaping the cost/price scissors that combined with drought to cut up 
the ranching sector. It could probably have enforced some medium, 
term sanity (conservationism and managed harvesting) on fishing 
helping restore that sector. It could (like Botswana) have 
negotiated diamond output levels with De Beers averting the over 50% 
1980-1985 volume cutback. Rossing would not have faced the term 
contract falling away and price cuts to sustain sales volume problems 
which exacerbated the general 1980s softening of the uranium oxide 
market. War and total uncertainty about the future helped dry up
4enterprise investment and certainly helped prevent structural change 
production sector investment comparable to - e.g. - Botswana's 
burgeoning (even if still small) manufacturing sector. The economic 
price of international political ostracism, domestic political 
uncertainty and war is a very high one - especially in an 
international economic context which has more generally turned sour 
for mineral export economies.
Occupation's Economic Cost: A Counterfactual Sketch
Since 1977 the Namibian economy has stagnated or recovered sluggishly 
in good years and declined in bad never growing at a rate equal to 
population for two consecutive years. This is a poor record by Sub- 
Saharan African standards. 1977-88 Namibian GDP growth was -2%. For 
Tanzania it was 16%. More to the point over 1980-88 Botswana, the 
most similar economy structurally and in absolute size achieved a 
nearly 10% annual growth of GDP. Clearly the outturn of South 
African economic oversight (in both meanings) in Namibia is 
unsatisfactory by any criteria.
To attempt to assess the cost in terms of lost GDP requires some 
counterfactual assumptions. One not unreasonable set are: a) South
Africa had allowed 435 process independence in 1977 and a stable 
SWAPO or SWAPO-SWANU-Damara Chiefs-NCDP government had emerged; b) in 
1978-79 transition had led to low growth because the outflow of white
high and middle level personnel was higher than Zimbabwe but lower
than Mozambique but initial post-independence assistance had allowed 
1% a year GDP growth; c) so 1980 GDP was about the same under this
scenario but, d) from 1980 a 5% a year average GDP growth rate was
achieved (about half that of Botswana).
The result would have been a 1988 GDP about 47% above 1980 instead of 
one about 5% below, i.e. a GDP per capita of the order of $1,250- 
1,300 versus $875-900 (in 1986 prices at 1986 exchange rates). 
Further GDP per capita would have risen about 1.5% a year instead of 
falling over 4% annually on average. That is the difference between 
economic success and economic failure. The 1988 GDP loss from 
occupation on this basis is of the order of $750 million (in 1986
5prices/exchange rates) and the cumulative 1980-88 loss of the order 
of $3,000 million or of the order of twice probable actual 1988 GDP
(in 1986 prices).
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Further for black Namibians that macro economic order of magnitude 
understates the difference. Namibia under occupation has one of the 
world's most unequal income distributions with 1983 white household 
incomes averaging R 20,000, a 10% black middle class (miners, public 
servants, businessmen, professionals) R 6,000 and the 60% of
Namibians who live in absolute poverty R 1,000, i.e. 20 to 1 between 
the white households and the main body of black households. Clearly 
any independent government would have moved on universal access to 
basic health care (where the white to black expenditure ratio under 
occupation is 10 to 1), education, water, agricultural and ranching
extension and services to small farmers and making room for the
'informal' sector and labour intensive public works. It is difficult 
to suppose less than a 100% gain over 1980-88 for the 60% now in
absolute poverty.
A quick check of components at sectoral and sub-sectoral level 
validates the plausibility of this scenario;
a. diamond output decline held to 20% (1,600,000 carats at the
trough) instead of over 50%;
b. renewal or closing of new term contracts for uranium oxide;
c. proving and opening of enough medium size mines to sustain base
metal output and proven reserves;
d. a 20-25,000 tonne EEC beef quota at well above RSA prices;
e. sensible fishery management leading by 1988 to substantial
stock recovery and catches;
f. a domestic small farmer and wage earner demand base expansion
allowing 50 to 75% higher manufacturing output from extant
6capacity and 1980s action on long delayed proposals e.g. 
cement, textiles;
g. grower price rationalisation in favour of crops boosting small 
farmer income from increased output of, e.g . maize, oilseed, 
cotton, tomatoes (for tomato sauce for fish tinning), fruits 
and vegetables as well as dairy products;
h. more pre-export processing of cattle - and of hides into 
leather and products - and of fish;
i. substitution of basic services (including extension) personnel 
for parallel racial administration bureaucrats and 'security' 
personnel leaving government employment (except for 
construction) about the same but sharply increasing both 
services and human investment;
j. ability to use the Ruacana Falls dam for power and developing
selective irrigation in the north;
k. shifting imports (and transport ) from high cost RSA to lower
cost global (and internal) sources (routes);
1. restoring productive sector fixed investment to positive net
levels via public sector investment and a less alarming and 
uncertain context encouraging domestic and foreign subsidiary 
private investment;
m. reforming taxation (including an independent customs and
excise) to increase revenues and mobilising external soft loans 
and technical assistance;
n. creating an independent currency decoupling (linked to trade
and transport as well as fiscal restructuring from the 
inflation and stagnation prone RSA economy which is hobbled by 
the economic inefficiency (to enterprises and for GDP growth 
and probably for many white as well as most black incomes) and 
the heavy costs of repression and bantustans leading to
7stagnation, inflation and chaotic interest and exchange rate 
swings.
In large part the answer to the query - but would this have been 
possible? - is that it was for Botswana which had less trained 
personnel at independence than Namibia would have even in 1978 (as of 
1988 it has more than any Southern African state except Zimbabwe had 
at independence a tribute to SWAPO's determined pursuit of training 
for Namibians and the UN and bilateral support under the "Nationhood 
Programme" umbrella raised by then UN Commissioner Martti Ahtisari). 
And 5% is only half the growth rate Botswana actually achieved 
(despite a drought roughly parallel to Namibia's).
Repression's Human Cost
The price of repression can be seen in the human condition indicators 
set out in Table 1 for Black Namibians in Occupied Namibia contrasted 
with those for Black Namibians in exile in Angola and for Botswana 
with subsidiary data underlining the racist divide in occupied 
Namibia's meaning for quality of life.
Every figure for black people in occupied Namibia - except GDP per 
capita - is worse than for either the exiles at Kwanza Sul or for 
Botswana. Indeed except for war ravaged Mozambique and Angola every 
figure is the worst or tied for the worst in the nine SADCC states 
plus Namibia (the occupied 10th) That GDP per capita is higher than 
for any SADCC state except Botswana underlines the willful nature of 
the failures on other counts - other states did more with less 
resources. And on GDP growth (as noted earlier) Namibia under 
occupation did very badly - over 1980-88 only war devastated 
Mozambique of the SADCC states fared worse.
The figures do not tell of widespread arbitrary arrests, beatings, 
rapes, tortures, detentions, murders and disappearances. One has to 
go to SWAPO data, The Namibian, court and inquest records and Church 
documentation for that. Nor do they show that about 100,000 
Namibians have fled into exile and 250,000-300,000 been dislocated
8from de jure and de facto free fire zones in the north (where normal 
rural life and often any rural production is no longer possible) into 
the Oshikati Triangle (where infrastructure for 50,000 is overwhelmed 
by 250-300,000 with water and sanitation grossly absent and malaria, 
plague and cholera grossly present and the squatter areas and 
townships around Windhoek and smaller Namibian towns. That is about 
20% of Namibia's people in foreign or domestic exile.
Further, UNICEF has recently broadened its 1986 war related death 
estimates for Angola and Mozambique to cover Namibia. Over 1980-88 
UNICEF's estimate is 90,000 souls dead who would otherwise be alive - 
about 5% of the estimated 1,700,000 domestic and exile population as 
of 1988.
UNICEF assumes 1978 independence and introduction of universal 
primary health care (as stated in SWAPO policy and practiced in 
exile) with 1988 infant and young child deaths 125 per 1,000 live 
births versus a present estimated actual of 300 (below the 325-375 
estimate for war wracked Angola and Mozambique but far above other 
SADCC states). That implies over 50,000 infants and young children 
dead because of the occupation who with independence and peace would 
be alive. Malnutrition and weakened health care have probably cost
20,000 more lives, civilian casualties of war 10,000 and combat 5,000 
each for PLAN and RSA's black local auxiliaries and mercenaries (plus 
at least 2,500 white South Africans) counting deaths from wounds, 
accidents and illness contracted while in uniform.
The death and human suffering like the economic price of Pretoria and 
its occupation is a heavy one on Namibia and Namibians - for 90,000 
of them over the past eight years literally a killing price.
Signs of Macroeconomic Stabilisation
After analysing the price of occupation and repression there is a 
certain ghastly irony in assessing the successes and limits of the 
occupation regime's 1985-88 stabilisation efforts. But they are 
serious, they are not totally ineffectual and the present and near
9term future state of the economy do determine to a not inconsiderable 
extent where an independent Namibia will start.
There is another irony - with the vertigenous GDP decline halted, the 
budget restructured (pruned) so that RSA transfers are less than 
'security' spending for RSA and the current external balance healthy, 
RSA is not touting its achievements. • Rather it is bad mouthing 
Namibia as an economic "basket case" to deter would-be supporters of 
the 435 process and the independent state. That by so doing it 
totally demoralises its own puppet government and the private sector 
in Namibia apparently no longer matters to it. Or perhaps it matters 
negatively - South Africa has decided to pull out before the end of 
1990 and is launching an economic destabilisation by disinformation 
campaign.
Gross Domestic Product after falling 2.3% in 1980, 0.3% in 1981, 2.2% 
in 1982, 3.1% in 1983, 1.5% in 1984 and 0.8% in 1985 rose 3.5% (in 
1980 prices) in 1986. In 1987 and 1988 it probably rose 2.0 to 2.5% 
a year. This bottoming out and partial recovery turns on the core 
productive sectors: agriculture, fishing, mining. In agriculture the 
end of drought and better prices for karakul have been crucial albeit 
1988 insect (locust and ormyworm) damage may halt the recovery. By 
1986 the fish catch appears to have stabilised albeit with over half 
of the 150-175,000 tonne 1986-88 levels the lower value maasbanker 
and mackerel and under 10% the previous mainstay - anchovies. 
Whether stocks really have recovered to make 150,000-200,000 tonne 
catches now and a recovery over 10 years to 500,000 tonnes 
sustainable is far from clear and arouses hot debate which given the 
scanty data available now cannot be resolved. Given RSA's past 
record there is reason to be sceptical. Mining recovery turns on 
higher base metal prices, surprising stability in Rossing's ability 
to sell and a substantial recovery in diamond prices and a lesser 
(but probably 20%) recovery in Consolidated Diamond Mines output by 
1988 from its 1985 lows.
Adjusting the 1986 official estimate of R 2,937,500 for its exclusion 
of Walvis Bay and gross underestimation of 'informal' sector and 
household own use (food and housing) production suggests a 1986 GDP 
of R 3,375,000 or about $900 per capita (at 1986 Rand/$ rates).
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Price and exchange rate stabilisation have eluded occupied Namibia. 
The Consumer Price Index rose on average over 12.5% a year over 1980- 
86 inclusive and probably 15% a year over 1987-88. In an economy 
with slow growth of monetary personal incomes and a healthy trade 
balance this is very high. So is the radical fall in the exchange 
rate from 0.778 to the USA $ in 1980 to 2.269 in 1986 and about 2.5 
in 1988, albeit worsening terms of trade could explain much of that. 
The answer of course is simple. Occupied Namibia produces very 
little (perhaps 10%) of the physical goods it produces and imports 
90% of the rest from high inflation South Africa while its currency 
is South Africa's debt, divestment and inflation ridden rand.
Central Government Revenue rose from R 640 million in 1981/82 to R 
1,571 million in 1986/87 and about R 1,900 in 1988/89. RSA transfers 
- excluding the payment in substitution for customs and excise - rose 
from negligible in 1980/81 to nearly R 475 million in 1986/87 but 
then fell to R 310 million odd in 1988/89 which is barely comparable 
to 'defence' and other 'security' costs of RSA paid by the occupation 
regime's domestic budget. In 1989/90 they are slated to fall to R 
100 million.
The payment in replacement for customs and excise rose from under R 
50 million in 1980/81 (when at 20-25% of imports it should have been 
about R 200-250 million) to R 350 million in 1986/87 (when on the 
same basis it should have been R 400-500 million) and R 400 million 
in 1988/89 (versus a probable reasonable level of R 500-625 million). 
Thus the shortfall here has in several years exceeded the so-called 
transfer proper, was probably over half of it in 1988/89 and will 
exceed it again in 1989/90. So much for South Africa's repeated 
claim that Namibia is fiscally unviable.
Expenditure by the central budget rose from R 1,036 million in 
1983/84 to R 1,900 million odd in 1987/88 and 1988/89. The 1988/89 
figure represents a sharp reduction (perhaps 8-10% since there were 
very limited pay rises) in real terms explaining the rapid 
deterioration reported in health and education.
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Since 1985/86 the occupation regime has been a small net repayer of 
debt not a net borrower. RSA guaranteed borrowings (de facto all 
other than normal bills being processed) fell from R 810 million in 
early 1986 to about R 750 million at the end of 1988. Of these R 190
million were asserted to be "domestic" - in occupied Namibia? - and R
560 million to be "foreign" - from RSA institutions? These 
breakdowns are a mystery as there is little evidence of substantial 
SWA stock holdings in Namibia (R 50 million for banks and other 
financial institutions is a high estimate). Nor has there been any 
evidence of sales outside RSA - despite assertions to the contrary. 
Indeed as the securities are (per prospectus) denominated in rand 
with interest payable in RSA it is a trifle difficult to see how they 
could be marketed abroad. The reversal of the 1981/82 - 1984/85
borrowing spree and the de facto admission by RSA that all the loans 
are rand denominated (and therefore, though RSA does not admit this, 
held by institutions in RSA or occupied Namibia) means that 
outstandings are far lower (especially in $ terms) than previous 
independent estimates of up to $750 million. This is in a sense of 
interest only to RSA despite its delaying tactic of demanding UN 
acceptance of liability. Both in general international law on state 
succession and also under the 1971 World Court opinion this 'debt' is 
void in respect to an independent Namibia because after 1966 South 
Africa was in illegal occupation and could not conclude binding 
economic contracts including issuing debt.
The Mining Sector - A Respite For What?
The mining sector is looking much better than in 1984 because in 1985
and 1987-88 base metal prices (while still historically low in real 
terms especially for copper) broke out of their 1975-84 trough; 
because Rossing managed to continue to find markets for 3,500 tonnes 
a year of uranium oxide at £60,000 at tonne, i.e. over $50 per pound 
despite supposed ending of term contracts and $20 per pound spot 
prices; and De Beers has both regained control over the diamond 
market's inventories and markup patterns and begun restoring output.
As a result copper, led and zinc (concentrate) production - primarily 
Tsumeb now rechristened Gold Fields Namibia - are well over 50,000,
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40,000 and 60,000 tonnes respectively, i.e. at 1980s highs. In 1985 
Tsumeb ended a string of losses with a post tax profit of R 39 
million and after a copper price fall linked decline to R 16 million 
in 1986 rose to over R 50 million in 1987 and a projected R 89 
million for 1988 against a 1980-84 total of R 16 million in losses.
Longer term problems remain. While prospecting and proving of 
deposits continue new mine development (except for a single gold 
mine) has been mothballed since the late 1970s both because of world 
prices and the political uncertainty surrounding Namibia. Output 
after 1990 will decline unless new mines are brought on stream. 
Further the Minorco-Congold (UK) takeover battle has ended the 
amicable Anglo-Goldfields (RSA) condominium in respect of Goldfields 
(RSA) and Goldfields (N) with unpredictable fallout.
Rossing's profit in 1986 was £55 million after tax - the same as 1985 
but only because of a higher tax charge as pre-tax rose from £90 to 
£95 million. The previous record level (on a higher tonnage) was £91 
million in 1982. Unless sanctions have actually begun to bite - 
which seems unlikely - Rossing looks set to have continued pre-tax 
profits in the £90 to 100 million range over 1987 and 1988 as lower 
rand exchange rates have offset rising rand prices so far as the hard 
currency denominated earnings go.
Consolidated Diamond Mines output fell from about 2 million carats in 
the late 1970s diamond boom to about 900,000 at the 1985 low but 
began recovery to over 1,000,000 in 1986 and may approach 1,250,000 
in 1988. De Beers has always used CDM (Oranjemund) as a "swing" mine 
to balance globally marketed output with demand so that the upswing 
may well continue. Ironically this is none too welcome from 
independent Namibia's point of view - a financially sound CDM is an 
asset but preferably one with as high reserves (including the now 
virtually certain upstream Orange River bank extension which De Beers 
clearly does not intend to develop until after independence) as 
possible.
After tax profits plummeted from peaks around R 200 million in the 
late 1970s to R 29 million in 1982 and R 33 million in 1984. 1985
and 1986 saw recovery to R 101 million and R 123 million with R 150
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million and up to R 200 million likely for 1987 and 1988. Direct and 
indirect diamond tax therefore is likely to have risen from about R 
40 million in 1983 to the order of R 200 million by 1988/89. Indeed 
the recovery of the world diamond market has been the dominant factor 
behind government revenue buoyancy in occupied Namibia.
Other Developments
RSA continued of offload territorial units on the interim government 
- in 1988 the railways system from SATs to the National Transport 
Corporation (NTC) which also took over Namib Air. Both are heavily 
loss making as presently operated.
While the major strikes - notably at Tsumeb - of 1987 were not 
repeated, 1988 was a third year of continuing large scale labour 
organisation with five major unions - mining, public service, 
commerce and finance and transport - now in the field. Their 
politics are analogous to those of COSATU in South Africa. Together 
with the Churches they are central to civil society resistance in 
Namibia to RSA rule because of the major restrictions on overt 
political party activity (except for the non-supported puppet parties 
of the Multi-Party Government).
SWAPO in 1988 continued its steady manpower development and refugee 
service programmes. With the 1986 publication of Namibia: 
Perspectives on National Reconstruction and Development planning 
moved from high key conferences on alternatives to lower key 
hammering out of choices.
Consultations with representatives of white settlers - especially but 
not only the German speaking community - were stepped up in 1988 with 
an important conference in Stockholm in July. Both sides expressed 
guarded optimism on the outcome. SWAPO viewed the results as 
providing a base for most farmers, small businessmen and technical 
civil servants to remain on terms acceptable to them and to SWAPO to 
avoid the type of transitional shocks (and settle financial losses) 
that characterised Angola, Mozambique and Algeria. At least the 
German speaking settlers seemed to take a similar view.
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In that sense the question is still - how soon? After what? 
Namibian independence is a pre-condition far more than stabilisation 
as settlers, foreign enterprises, most observers and SWAPO (and in 
private RSA) agree. It is also inevitable but how soon remains 
unclear, an unclarity that is a drag on the economy as is the 
continuing state of war.
TABLE 1
oSelected economic and quality of life indicators - Namibians 1986
Black Namibians 
In Namibia
In Exile 
In Angola
Botswana 
As Comparison
Population (millions) 1.5 (0.1) 0.075 1.2
Under 5 mortality (per 1000
births) 235-300b (30) 70 95
Infant mortality (0-1) (per 
1000 births) 175-200° (21) 50 70
Infant and child
malnutrition {%) 35-50 (5) 2.5 (23.6)f 32
Average calorie intake rel­
ative to requirements {%) 80 ( 100) 100 94
Access to health services (%) 60 (10 0) 100 90
Access to safe water (%) 33 (100) 75 80
Primary enrollment ($) 60-75 (100) 100 90
Adult (over 15) literacy ($) 30 (100) 75 65
One-year-olds fully
vaccinated (%) 
TB 30 (NA) 100 70
DPT 30 (NA) 70 82
Polio NA (NA) 70 77
Measles 25-3°, (NA) 100 75
Life Expectancy at birth 40-43 (69) NA 57
GNP per capita (national)
Per Cent in absolute poverty
$900
65 (Negl)
$350-500°
10
$1000
20s
Notes:
a. Data for Black Namibians in Namibia are not all for 1986. Given general economic 
deterioration it is likely earlier statistics show less bad position than later 
ones would.
b. ( ) Figures are for white population.
c. The lower figures are based on official Windhoek data; the higher make 
conservative allowances for the higher rates in rural areas.
d. 43 is based on official mortality returns which overweight Windhoek and almost 
certainly under-record deaths.
e. Estimate of external assistance in cash and kind ($10 to 15 million) and camp 
value added in services ($5 to 7-5 million); not strictly speaking territorial 
product.
f. 23.6 if "at risk" category is added to "malnourished" and "undernourished".
g. After food security and related transfer payments.
Sources:
Based on or estimated from "Health and Social Welfare", "Water and Resources", "Macro 
Economic Structures, Trends and Perspectives", "Education and Culture" and "Labour and 
Employment" in United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for
National Reconstruction and Development, Lusaka 1986; N. Anderson, Health Sector 
Policy Options for Independent Namibia, UNIN, Lusaka 1984; Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Namibia: Country Profile 19 8 7—8 8, London, 198 8; SWAPO Department Of Health And 
Social Welfare, Report From the Under-5-Clinic Team, Luanda, 1986 and Annual Progress 
Report, Luanda, 19 8 8.
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